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This article considers the extent to which a legal right to equality and non-
discrimination – as it has been expressed and developed in international law, 
domestic legislation and constitutional provisions – can support inclusion in 
education for persons with disabilities. Article 24 of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and other relevant 
human rights standards serve as reference points for this discussion. The article 
explores the concepts of disability (based on the social model), substantive equal-
ity, and inclusion and argues that these notions combine to form a theoretical 
foundation for a strong legal framework that requires transformative measures. 
It considers how these concepts are refl ected in international human rights law 
and how they have been applied in Hong Kong domestic law. It concludes that 
legal reforms are necessary for Hong Kong to fully implement its obligations to 
ensure inclusive education and substantive equality under the CRPD.
I. Introduction
This article considers the extent to which a legal right to equality and 
non-discrimination – as it has been expressed and developed in inter-
national law, domestic legislation and constitutional provisions – can 
achieve or support inclusion in education for persons with disabilities. 
It explores the concept of equality and argues that when understood 
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in its substantive sense – beyond a formal notion of equal treatment – 
equality has the potential to transform barriers to inclusion and achieve 
full participation and the equal enjoyment of rights, including the right 
to education. Substantive equality as a transformative principle requires 
a contextual analysis to identify disadvantage – an understanding which 
is particularly important when addressing disability discrimination. 
Insights into the nature of disability have revealed that disability is not 
merely defi ned by an individual’s physical or mental impairments, but is 
instead a function of social and environmental impediments. Substan-
tive equality is necessary to address discrimination arising from these 
impediments since they must be identifi ed and then transformed before 
inclusion is possible. Equal treatment in a formal sense – treating likes 
alike and thus ignoring characteristics such as disability which should be 
irrelevant when allocating opportunities – may perpetuate discrimina-
tion resulting from structures which cater to a non-disabled norm but 
exclude, and thus render invisible, persons with disabilities.
The right to equality as it has developed in international human rights 
law refl ects this substantive imperative. Attempts to achieve its realisa-
tion at the domestic level, however, have seen mixed results as legisla-
tors, policy-makers and courts fl uctuate between embracing the change 
demanded by substantive equality and attempting to limit its impact on 
the status quo by retreating to a formal principle. 
The framework and reference point for this examination of equal-
ity law and its relationship to inclusive education is the 2006 United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD).1 The Convention emphasises the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination in its substantive sense, provides for a right to edu-
cation, and elaborates the concept of inclusion in education and the 
relevant state obligations.2 Although the CRPD sets out the most perti-
nent and far-reaching set of standards in this context, other key instru-
ments also enumerate a right to equality – in general and in relation to 
education in particular – and therefore have a bearing on this analysis. 
These include the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the 1989 Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC).3 Although the 1979 Convention on the Elimina-
tion of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 
1 The CRPD is available on the web site of the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/disabilities-convention.htm (accessed 25 July 2010).
2 Ibid. Art 2 (discrimination) and Art 24 (right to education and inclusive education).
3 These treaties are available on the web site of the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#core (accessed 25 July 2010).
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1965 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (CERD) do not address disability discrimination explicitly, their 
monitoring bodies have interpreted equality according to a substantive 
model and contributed to the development of its content in interna-
tional law more generally.4
After a review of relevant international standards, this article then 
considers domestic equality and anti-discrimination law with a focus 
on the Hong Kong legal framework including the Disability Discrimi-
nation Ordinance (DDO) (which is based on UK and Australian anti-
discrimination law)5 and constitutional equality provisions in the Hong 
Kong Basic Law6 – Hong Kong’s regional constitution – and the Bill of 
Rights which essentially duplicates the ICCPR.7 Hong Kong arguably 
has one of the most comprehensive legal regimes for addressing discrimi-
nation in the Asian region and has the potential to infl uence initiatives 
in China and elsewhere. In addition, since the Bill of Rights copies the 
provisions of the ICCPR and Hong Kong courts are often willing to cite 
the interpretive materials produced by the human rights treaty monitor-
ing bodies, developments in international human rights law may have a 
particular impact in the Hong Kong context. Hong Kong provisions are 
explored with reference to law from other jurisdictions, especially the 
Australian Disability Discrimination Act8 which most closely resembles 
the Hong Kong legislation, in order to elucidate both the potential and 
limitations of the Hong Kong model and suggest possible alternative 
approaches that could strengthen legal support for inclusion in educa-
tion in Hong Kong.
This review of international and domestic standards suggests that 
while equality law – when underpinned by a substantive principle – can 
4 These treaties are available at ibid. For examples of relevant interpretations by the monitor-
ing bodies, see the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, General Recommendation No 25: Temporary Special Measures, UN Doc A/59/38, 
2004 and the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen-
eral Recommendation 32: The Meaning and Scope of Special Measures in the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc CERD/C/
GC/32, August 2009.
5 Cap 487, Laws of Hong Kong. See Carole J. Petersen, “A Progressive Law with Weak Enforce-
ment? An Empirical Study of Hong Kong’s Disability Law”, (2005) 25(4) Disability Studies 
Quarterly.
6 1990 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of 
China.
7 The Hong Kong Bill of Rights copies most of the provisions in the 1966 International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and is included as Part II of the Bill of Rights 
Ordinance (Cap 383), Laws of Hong Kong.
8 Australian Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (DDA).
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support efforts towards inclusion, it also has limitations.9 Speakers at a 
conference on the CRPD and inclusion in education held in Hong Kong 
in November 2009 expressed scepticism about the potential of equality 
law – and law generally – to serve as an effective driving force for greater 
inclusion. Chong Chan-yau pointed out that the disability community in 
Hong Kong had been hopeful that the DDO would have a positive impact 
when it was enacted in 1995 since they believed it would require action 
on the part of the government and others to address discrimination.10 He 
remarked, however, that the Ordinance in fact has a “defensive” rather 
than “promotional” orientation and does not emphasise positive duties 
on government and other actors to ensure non-discrimination.11 Carole 
Petersen argued that relying solely on anti-discrimination legislation was 
not suffi cient and pointed out that some countries, including the United 
States, had made greater progress since passing specifi c education legisla-
tion elaborating the required measures to achieve inclusion beyond an 
anti-discrimination framework.12 Wayne MacKay expressed confi dence 
that wide support for the policy of inclusion exists in Canada, but he was 
less certain that educators and the general public would embrace the 
law as a means of realising more inclusive schools. He observed that, 
“[l]awyers and judges are more often regarded as sources of fog shroud-
ing the education process, than as beacons of light to guide educators 
through the complex fog of public education”.13
Nevertheless, there was general affi rmation that the law has a role 
to play in reaching solutions. Vernor Muñoz, the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, noted the urgency of 
9 For a discussion of the limits of law in the disability context, see, for example, Melinda Jones 
and Lee Ann Basser Marks, “Law and the Social Construction of Disability” in Melinda Jones 
and Lee Ann Basser Marks (eds), Disability, Divers-ability, and Legal Change (The Hague: Klu-
wer Law International, 1999). They note that “[w]hat it is very important to appreciate is that 
even if there existed a perfect regime of human rights, a system of formal law promoting and 
empowering people with disabilities, this is only going to be a small part of what is necessary to 
bring about true equality for people with disabilities” (at 4). 
10 Chong Chan-yau, “Implementing Inclusion: Challenges and Opportunities”, presentation at 
Inclusion in Education: Implementation of Article 24 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, The University of Hong Kong, 28 November 2009.
11 Ibid.
12 Carole J. Petersen, “Inclusive Education and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Rights and 
Interests”, paper presented at Inclusion in Education n 10 above. See also Carole J. Petersen, 
“Rights and Interests: Alternative Dispute Resolution and Inclusive Education”, (2010) 
40 HKLJ 481.
13 A. Wayne MacKay, “An International Call for Action and Canada’s Long and Winding Road 
to Inclusion: The Canadian Experience”, (2010) 40 HKLJ 449 at 466 also presented at Inclusion 
in Education, n 10 above, at 24.
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the situation14 and observed that the widespread denial of the human 
right to education of persons with disabilities stems from utilitarian 
visions of education as a privilege or commercial asset, rather than a 
right provided by law.15 He therefore underscored the signifi cance of 
human rights law and urged states to harmonise their national legisla-
tion with international standards as part of the process towards greater 
inclusion.16
MacKay also emphasised the signifi cance of equality law. He con-
tended that despite the perception that law contributes to a lack of clarity: 
“the concept of equality, properly understood and applied with adequate 
resources can be the lighthouse that guides us to more inclusive, effective 
and even safer public schools”.17 This metaphor of “light” echoes state-
ments made by the United Nations Secretary-General and the President 
of the European Disability Forum in relation to the CRPD and the fact 
that it was adopted on the day of St. Lucy, patron saint of blindness and 
light.18 These characterisations of the Convention and other sources of 
a legal right to equality and education in international and domestic law 
reveal a sense of optimism in the law’s role as a tool for achieving inclu-
sion. Much of the potential of equality law for furthering the objectives 
of inclusion, however, depends on how the equality principle is refl ected 
in and promoted through law and policy. When understood in a substan-
tive rather than strictly formal sense, equality can contribute towards 
achieving the goals of inclusion as expressed in Article 24 of the CRPD.
In the Hong Kong context, although the DDO is an important start-
ing point for protecting students with disabilities from discrimination 
by educational institutions, its potential is weakened by several factors. 
14 Globally only around 5% of children with disabilities manage to complete primary education 
and in many developing countries the numbers do not even reach 1%. Vernor Muñoz, Keynote 
address at Inclusion in Education, n 10 above. See also United Nations, Offi ce of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights, Inter-Parliamentary Union, “From Exclusion to Equality: Realiz-
ing the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Handbook for Parliamentarians on the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (2007), available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/
documents/toolaction/ipuhb.pdf.
15 Ibid. (Muñoz).
16 Ibid.
17 See n 13 above at 466 (HKLJ) and 24–25 (conference paper).
18 Offi cial Statement of the UN Secretary-General, “Secretary-General Hails the Adop-
tion of Landmark Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 13 December 2006, 
SG.SM/10797, HR/4911, L/T/4400 cited in Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, “Out of 
Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 
(2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1, at 2–3. The President of the European Disability Forum 
stated at the Convention’s Signature Opening Ceremony that “[t]his is a Convention to bring 
those in darkness into light” after quoting Bertold Brecht: “Some there are who live in dark-
ness; While the others live in light; We see those who live in daylight; Those in the darkness 
out of sight”. UN Press Release, “Record Number of countries Sign UN Treaty on Disabilities 
on Opening Day”, 30 March 2007. Cited in Kayess and French, at 3.
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These include (1) a broad exception in the education provisions; (2) the 
need to identify a similarly situated comparator in order to prove direct 
discrimination and the courts’ interpretation of this requirement; (3) an 
overly narrow defi nition of discrimination; and (4) the lack of an explicit 
duty to provide accommodation in order to avoid discrimination. Despite 
policy statements that highlight inclusion as an objective,19 Hong Kong 
does not have in place specifi c legislation on education which stipulates 
the necessary environment and features for achieving inclusion. The 
impetus towards inclusion in Hong Kong remains within the realm of 
education policy rather than law.
This article argues, therefore, that in order to fully implement its 
responsibilities under the CRPD – especially the right to education in 
Article 24 – Hong Kong needs to implement legal reforms to address 
these issues. The CRPD provides a framework which refl ects a concept of 
substantive equality more capable of achieving inclusion and the DDO 
needs to be analysed, assessed, and potentially amended, taking these 
standards into account.
Section II of this article discusses the concepts of disability, inclusion 
and equality and their expression in international human rights instru-
ments, especially the CRPD. Section III examines the Hong Kong legal 
framework, including the Hong Kong Basic Law, the Bill of Rights and 
the DDO. It considers the DDO in detail with reference to the concepts 
of inclusion and equality and the international standards described in 
section II. It also compares the DDO’s approach to disability discrimina-
tion statutes and equality guarantees in other jurisdictions. Section IV 
concludes with several recommendations for legal reform in Hong Kong 
based on this analysis.
II.  The Concepts of Disability, Inclusion and Equality and Their 
Development in International Human Rights Law
The concepts of disability, inclusion and substantive equality have found 
expression in international human rights law, especially the CRPD, and 
19 Eugenie Woo, Senior Specialist (Special Education Support 4, Education Bureau), “Educa-
tion for Students with Special Educational Needs (SEN) in Ordinary Schools in Hong Kong” 
presentation at Inclusion in Education, n 10 above. See also Education Bureau, Hong Kong 
SAR, “Catering for Student Differences: Indicators for Inclusion: A Tool for Self-evaluation 
and School Development”, August 2008, available at: http://www.edb.gov.hk/FileManager/
EN/Content_7383/indicators-082008_e.pdf. This document acknowledges Tony Booth 
and Mel Ainscow, Centre for Studies on Inclusive Education (CSIE), “Index for Inclusion: 
Developing Learning and Participation in Schools” (edited and produced for CSIE by Mark 
Vaughan, 2000). 
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form a matrix of overlapping and reinforcing principles which have the 
potential to strengthen legal mechanisms for inclusion if they are imple-
mented effectively into domestic law. This section considers these concepts, 
their interaction, and the obligations arising from their articulation as legal 
norms.
Competing Models and Meanings of Disability
The CRPD represents a “paradigm shift” away from the medical model of 
disability – an understanding of disability which emphasises the impact 
of individual impairments – and instead embraces the social model 
which recognises that disability is created by impediments in society.20 
The Convention, as a core human rights treaty, also places the concerns 
of persons with disabilities fi rmly within a human rights framework.21 
The medical model defi nes disability with reference to impairments – 
and within this model there has been debate about which impairments 
should be included. For example, whether mental and intellectual as well 
as physical conditions constitute disabilities and whether these must be 
long term in nature.22
Advocates for the “social” model observe instead that disability is caused 
by barriers in the environment – both physical and attitudinal – and is not 
inherent in any particular impairment.23 Although the Convention does 
20 See n 18 above (Kayess and French) generally and at 3 citing Ambassador Don MacKay, Per-
manent Representative of New Zealand in the UN and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, “Commentary at a High-Level Dialogue held 
in association with the Signature Ceremony of the Convention, from Vision to Action: The 
Road to Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, New 
York, 30 March 2007 and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Louise 
Arbor UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Ad Hoc Committee’s Adoption of the 
International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, 5 December 2006.
21 Ibid. (Kayess and French), at 3. See also Susan Marks and Andrew Clapham, International 
Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp 107–120.
22 For example in the United Kingdom 1995 Disability Discrimination Act a person has a dis-
ability for the purposes of the Act if he/she has a physical or mental impairment which has a 
substantial and long-term adverse effect on his/her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activi-
ties. The Hong Kong DDO does not specify that the effect or impairment must be long-term in 
nature.
23 See French and Kayess, n 18 above, at 5–7. For discussion and critique of the social model as 
well as developments in the fi elds of disability studies and disability theory, see, for example, 
Colin Barnes and Geoff Mercer, Exploring Disability (Polity, 2nd edn, 2010); Michael Oliver, 
Understanding Disability: From Theory to Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edn, 
2009); Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs (London: Routledge, 2006); Colin Barnes 
and Geoff Mercer (eds), Implementing the Social Model of Disability: Theory and Research (Leeds: 
Disability Press, 2004); Jones and Marks, n 9 above; Simi Linton, Claiming Disability: Knowledge 
and Identity (New York: New York University Press, 1998); and John Swain, Sally French, Colin 
Barnes, and Carol Thomas (eds), Disabling Barriers: Enabling Environments (London: Sage, 1993).
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not defi ne disability in its “defi nitions” section, it provides some guidance 
and its approach clearly refl ects the social model. For example, the pre-
amble – which forms part of the context for the purpose of interpreting 
the treaty24 – states that: “Disability is an evolving concept and … results 
from the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal 
and environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective participa-
tion in society on an equal basis with others”.25 In other words, disability 
involves the ways in which social structures and attitudes create disadvan-
tage and limit participation: the focus is on the social and environmental 
obstacles rather than the impairment.
Martha Nussbaum has observed that this insight about disability 
forces a re-evaluation of what we assume to be “normal” or “neutral”. 
She writes that “public space is arranged to cater to the impairments of 
the ‘normal’ case.26 What is different about people who are blind and deaf 
and wheelchair-users is that their abilities are typically not catered for, 
because they are impaired in an unusual way”.27 To illustrate this point, 
she compares the use of wheelchairs by the physically disabled to the use 
of cars and buses by what she calls “normals”. “Normals” also have limi-
tations: their legs can only go so fast and they use cars and buses as aids 
to move around. She observes that “public space is arranged to accom-
modate cars and buses – through the building of roads, parking lots, bus 
stops, etc. – but that it’s not arranged to cater to prostheses used by the 
atypically disabled”.28 In other words, everyone has limitations but society 
is generally structured only to accommodate “normal” impairments such 
as having legs. The sources of disadvantage are based in society which is 
not “neutral” in the way it affects different groups with diverse needs.29
Concepts of Equality and Inclusion
There is a close connection between the social model of disability and 
a right to substantive equality and non-discrimination as it has been 
24 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 31. 
25 Preamble CRPD (n 1 above). See also the non-exhaustive statement provided in Art 1 of the 
Convention that “[p]ersons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, men-
tal, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder 
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. Note that Art 1 
sets out the “Purpose” of the Convention and that no defi nition of “disability” is included under 
Art 2: “Defi nitions”. 
26 Nussbaum Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press: Harvard University Press, 
2006), pp 116–117.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
Article_11.indd   426 9/16/2010   5:55:15 PM
Vol 40 Part 2 Equality and Inclusion in Education 427
developing in international human rights law and some domestic juris-
dictions. Substantive equality is generally contrasted with the more tra-
ditional notion of “formal equality” based on a “neutral”, colour-blind 
principle of equal treatment which demands that likes be treated alike.30 
According to this theory, originally based on Aristotle’s dictum that things 
that are alike should be treated alike,31 factors such as gender, race or dis-
ability are irrelevant and should not be considered. The problem with this 
approach is that it does not account for actual power imbalances among 
groups and communities. So if people are not starting from the same posi-
tion due to past, systemic discrimination, treating them alike will not 
redress disadvantage. In fact, it may actually create or perpetuate existing 
discrimination and social hierarchies.
This may be especially true in the case of disability, where, as discussed 
above, social and environmental structures clearly create impediments and 
barriers to accessing opportunities. In contrast, substantive equality man-
dates a contextual examination that considers the actual circumstances 
facing a community – and individuals within that community – and an 
assessment of the group’s degree of marginalisation. Substantive equality 
may require positive duties, special measures or affi rmative action.
Sandra Fredman is one of a number of scholars who have described the 
problems with formal equality and argued for a conceptual shift towards 
a substantive model.32 She has suggested that equality should have four 
aims: (1) fi rst it should break the cycle of disadvantage for out-groups; 
(2) next it should promote respect for the equal dignity and worth of all, 
thereby redressing stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence based 
on group membership; (3) third, it should entail positive affi rmation and 
celebration of identity within community; and (4) fourth, it should facili-
tate full participation in society.33 Substantive equality pursues these aims 
and has been described as a transformative project – in much the same 
30 The distinction between formal and substantive equality and the limitations and conceptual 
diffi culties with the equal treatment principle have been extensively discussed in academic lit-
erature. For a sampling, see, for example, Sandra Fredman, “The Future of Equality in Britain” 
Working Paper Series No. 5 (Equal Opportunities Commission: 2002); Peter Westen, “The 
Empty Idea of Equality”, (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537; Catherine A. MacKinnon, “Dif-
ference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination” reprinted in Catherine A. MacKinnon, Femi-
nism Unmodifi ed, (Harvard University Press, 1988); Christine M. Koggel, Perspectives on Equal-
ity: Constructing a Relational Theory (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, 1998), 
pp 75–76; Christopher McCrudden, “The New Concept of Equality”, (2003) 4 ERA-Forum 9; 
Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Russell Sage Foun-
dation; Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1992); and Patricia Hughes, “Recognizing 
Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle”, (1999) 22 Dalhousie Law 
Journal 5.
31 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, V.3 1131a–1131b (trans. into English by W. Ross, 1925).
32 Fredman (n 30 above).
33 Ibid. and Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford University Press, 2007), p 10.
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way that the disability movement has sought to transform social struc-
tures to remove systemic discrimination and make society more inclusive.
Inclusion – in education as well as other areas – is the realisation of 
substantive equality and ensuring a right to equality demands inclusion.34 
Achieving inclusion/equality necessitates breaking down the social barri-
ers that cause disability (according to the social model) and transforming 
discriminatory structures through the application of special measures. To 
some degree, an ideal, full version of equality would eliminate “disabil-
ity” in the pure social model sense, since the social and environmental 
barriers would be gone, while still embracing the value of human diver-
sity, one of Fredman’s suggested equality aims. In this way these concepts 
– inclusion, equality and disability – come together, reinforce each other 
and express their transformative potential.
Substantive Equality in International Human Rights Law
The core international human rights instruments – seven of which are 
binding on Hong Kong – articulate a substantive principle of equality 
in international law which refl ects these concepts and objectives and 
obligates states to respect and ensure fundamental rights without dis-
crimination, including the right to education.35 They require that states 
examine context and disadvantage, take necessary measures to redress 
de facto discrimination, and provide an environment for inclusion. As 
a result, they form a strong international legal basis for implementing 
inclusive education at the domestic level. 
These treaties include general human rights conventions – the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR – which, along with the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, form the International Bill of Human Rights and 
provide the foundational principle of equality and non-discrimination 
which underpins all human rights.36 A number of specialised treaties 
provide additional protection from discrimination on specifi c grounds. 
34 For a discussion of the meaning of “inclusion” and inclusion in education, see, for example, 
Vernor Muñoz, “The right to education of persons with disabilities”, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to education (2007); Booth and Ainscow (n 19 above); and Lee Ann 
Basser and Melinda Jones, “Fostering Inclusive Societal Values Through Law”, (2002) 10 The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 371–402.
35 For discussion of the right to education in international law in the context of disability, see, for 
example, Muñoz (Ibid.); Basser and Jones (Ibid.), at 376–386; and Lee Ann Basser, “Justice for 
All? The Challenge of Realizing the Right to Education for Children with Disabilities”, (2005) 
Journal of Gender Race & Justice 531–559.
36 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts 1 and 2; ICCPR, Arts 2(1), 3 and 26; ICESCR, 
Arts 2(2) and 3.
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These include the CERD, which prohibits discrimination on the grounds 
of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, and CEDAW which 
prohibits discrimination against women. The CRC is another human 
rights instrument which is particularly relevant to inclusion in educa-
tion. Unlike the other treaties, it explicitly adds “disability” to the list of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination.37 It also provides for the key prin-
ciple that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration”.38
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR sets out the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination in the context of states’ general obligations under 
the Covenant. States parties must respect and ensure to all individu-
als within their territories and subject to their jurisdictions the rights 
recognised in the Covenant, “without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status”. Article 26 provides for 
an autonomous right – not linked exclusively to the rights enumerated 
in the Covenant itself – to equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law without discrimination:39
“In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee 
to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.40
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (the treaty-monitoring 
body for the ICCPR) has interpreted these provisions to contain a right 
to substantive equality noting that States Parties must sometimes “take 
affi rmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which 
cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant”. 
This “may involve granting for a time to the part of the population con-
cerned certain preferential treatment in specifi c matters as compared 
with the rest of the population. However, as long as such action is needed 
to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation 
under the Covenant”.41 In this sense, such “preferential” treatment is 
37 CRC Art 2(1).
38 CRC Art 3(1).
39 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, in UN Doc HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.610, November 1989, para 12.
40 Art 26.
41 Human Rights Committee (n 39 above) para 10.
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part and parcel to ensuring equality and does not constitute an exception 
to the principle of non-discrimination.42
Like its counterpart in the ICCPR, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR 
mandates that states parties guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
Covenant – including the right to education in Articles 13 and 1443 – will 
be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. The Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which monitors implementation of the ICESCR, has 
clarifi ed that in order to fulfi l these responsibilities states must address 
both formal and substantive discrimination: 
“Eliminating discrimination in practice requires paying suffi cient attention 
to groups of individuals which suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead 
of merely comparing the formal treatment of  individuals in similar situa-
tions. States parties must therefore immediately adopt the necessary mea-
sures to prevent, diminish and eliminate the conditions and attitudes which 
cause or perpetuate substantive or de facto discrimination …”.44
In addition, states must, in some cases, “adopt special measures to attenu-
ate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination” in order to 
“eliminate substantive discrimination”.45 The Committee notes that 
such “measures are legitimate to the extent that they represent reason-
able, objective and proportional means to redress de facto discrimina-
tion and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably 
achieved”.46 
The Committee has also explained that measures needed to 
fulfi l a right to education under the Covenant will vary according to 
42 See Warwick McKean, Equality and Non-discrimination under International Law (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1983), p 159. McKean makes this point in relation to the special measures provisions 
in the CERD.
43 Art 13 provides that states parties recognise the right of everyone to education and agree that 
education should be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense 
of its dignity. With a view to achieving the full realisation of this right, states parties recognise 
that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all and secondary and higher 
education be made available and accessible. It also recognises the freedom of parents to choose 
schools for their children other than those established by the authorities. Art 14 requires that 
states parties which had not been able to provide free, compulsory primary education at the 
time of becoming a party to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation within a reasonable number of years of the principle of compulsory primary 
education free of charge for all.
44 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20: Non-
discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20, 10 June 
2009, para 8(b).
45 Ibid. para 9.
46 Ibid.
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the situation, but that every system must have four essential features: 
(1) “availability” (the existence of functioning institutions); (2) “acces-
sibility” (non-discrimination and physical and economic accessibility); 
(3) “acceptability” (relevant form and substance, culturally appropriate 
and of good quality); and (4) “adaptability” (fl exible and able to adapt to 
changing needs).47 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women has also interpreted the right to equality in CEDAW as a right 
to “substantive equality” which has transformative capacity. It requires 
that the lives of women and men “be considered in a contextual way, and 
measures adopted towards a real transformation of opportunities, insti-
tutions and systems so that they are no longer grounded in historically 
determined male paradigms of power and life patterns”.48
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
similarly interpreted obligations in the CERD according to a theory 
of substantive equality noting that “[t]he principle of equality under-
pinned by the Convention combines formal equality before the law with 
equal protection of the law, with substantive or de facto equality in the 
enjoyment and exercise of human rights as the aim to be achieved by 
the faithful implementation of its principles”.49 The Convention pro-
hibits discrimination in effect and the application of the principle of 
non-discrimination involves taking the characteristics of groups into 
consideration.50 The Convention – like the other instruments described 
above – also necessitates positive measures in certain circumstances and 
these should not be viewed as “an exception to the principle of non-dis-
crimination but are integral to its meaning and essential to the Conven-
tion project of eliminating racial discrimination and advancing human 
dignity and effective equality”.51
The Committee on the Rights of the Child also recognises that the non-
discrimination obligation in Article 2 of the CRC “requires States actively 
to identify individual children and groups of children the recognition and 
realisation of whose rights may demand special measures”.52 It refers to the 
47 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13: The Right to 
Education, UN Doc E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999, para 6. See also Katarina Tomaševski, 
“Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education”, UN Doc E/
CN.4/1999/49, 1999 and Marks and Clapham (n 21 above) pp 133–147. 
48 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (n 4 above) para 10.
49 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (n 4 above) para 6.
50 Ibid. para 8.
51 Ibid. para 20.
52 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 5: General Measures of 
Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/5, 
27 November 2003 para 12.
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Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 18, discussed above, noting 
that “the application of the non-discrimination principle of equal access to 
rights does not mean identical treatment” and that special measures may be 
necessary to diminish or eliminate discrimination.53 This approach refl ects 
the social and human rights models of disability and the Committee has 
affi rmed that while children with disabilities are facing diffi culties and bar-
riers to the enjoyment of human rights, these barriers are “not the disability 
itself but rather a combination of social, cultural, attitudinal and physi-
cal obstacles which children with disabilities encounter in their daily lives. 
The strategy for promoting their rights is therefore to take the necessary 
action to remove those barriers”.54 
The Committee has highlighted the key role of education and the 
importance of ensuring non-discrimination in the provision of educa-
tion and begins to articulate a framework for inclusion: “[d]iscrimination 
in service provision excludes [children with disabilities] from education 
and denies them access to quality health and social services. The lack 
of appropriate education and vocational training discriminates against 
them by denying them job opportunities in the future”.55 Providing qual-
ity education without discrimination involves “modifi cation to school 
practices and for training of regular teachers to prepare them to teach 
children with diverse abilities and ensure that they achieve positive edu-
cational outcomes”.56 
Equality and Inclusion in the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities
These approaches and the connection between the social model of dis-
ability and a transformative understanding of substantive equality are 
further strengthened in the CRPD, the most recent – and arguably the 
most far-reaching – of the human rights treaties.57 While the CRPD 
53 Ibid. Citing n 39 above.
54 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 9: The Rights of Children with 
Disabilities, UN Doc CRC/C/GC/9, 27 February 2007, para 5.
55 Ibid. para 8.
56 Ibid. para 62.
57 For discussion of the Convention, see French and Kayess (n 18 above); Arlene S. Kanter, “The 
Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities”, (2007) 34 Syracuse J. of Int’l L. & Com. 287–321; Don MacKay, “The United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, (2007) 34 Syracuse J. of Int’l L. 
& Com. 323–331; Anna Lawson, “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: New Era or False Dawn?”, (2007) 34 Syracuse J. of Int’l L. & Com. 563–619; 
Michael Ashley Stein and Janet E. Lord, “Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, (2007) 13 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 
167–185; and Frédéric Mégret, “The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities or Disability Rights?”, (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 494–516. 
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affi rms the principle of equality, it goes beyond the non-discrimination 
focus of CEDAW and CERD since it does not concentrate on discrimi-
nation alone but enumerates key civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights and their application in the context of disability. These 
rights must be guaranteed without discrimination of any kind on the 
basis of disability.58 
In the preamble and in many of its provisions, the Convention 
emphasises the need to transform social structures in order to ensure 
the rights of persons with disabilities in all areas. It promotes substan-
tive equality requiring positive, proactive measures to address the actual 
disadvantage and marginalisation encountered by persons with disabili-
ties. The remainder of this section examines two key provisions in par-
ticular: (1) the defi nition of discrimination – which includes indirect 
discrimination as well as the denial of reasonable accommodation; and 
(2) Article 24 of the Convention which sets out the framework and obli-
gations for inclusion in education. 
The Defi nition of Discrimination and Reasonable Accommodation
The defi nition of discrimination in Article 2 essentially copies the defi -
nitions of discrimination found in other human rights instruments and 
General Comments issued by human rights treaty bodies.59 It provides 
that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of disability means any distinction, 
exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the ‘purpose 
or effect’ of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, civil or any other fi eld”. The phrase “purpose or 
effect” has been interpreted to indicate that human rights instruments 
prohibit both direct and indirect discrimination.60
Direct discrimination means less favourable treatment on the basis 
of a prohibited ground (such as race, gender or disability). Indirect dis-
crimination, by contrast, occurs when a seemingly neutral practice has a 
negative, disproportionate effect on a disadvantaged group. For example, 
an education policy or practice that effectively excludes or marginalises 
persons with disabilities could amount to de facto discrimination (or sub-
stantive inequality) even in situations where it appears neutral on its 
58 Art 3(b) (General Principles: Non-discrimination) and Art 4(1) (States General Obligations to 
“undertake to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability”).
59 See the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art 1; the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Art 1; the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 44 above) para 7, and Human Rights 
Committee (n 39 above) para 7.
60 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (n 4 above) para 8 and Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (n 4 above) para 7.
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face and where the policy-maker did not intend to discriminate. Since 
apparently neutral social or environmental structures often have unequal 
impact on persons with impairments and can create disability, a defi ni-
tion of discrimination that includes de facto discrimination is especially 
important. Tackling indirect disability discrimination – and achieving 
real equality – often requires positive measures such as installing ramps 
for wheelchair users or promoting “universal design”61 products.
The definition in the CRPD goes further than previous instru-
ments, however, and specifies that discrimination on the basis of 
disability “includes all forms of discrimination, including denial of 
reasonable accommodation”.62 The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has also interpreted the meaning of discrimina-
tion under the ICESCR as it applies to persons with disabilities to 
include the denial of reasonable accommodation.63 The CRPD fur-
ther defines “reasonable accommodation” as “necessary and appropri-
ate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or 
undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons 
with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with 
others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms”.64 This could 
entail alteration of environmental barriers – thus reflecting the social 
model of disability as well as a concept of substantive equality – but 
only to the point where accommodation becomes a disproportion-
ate or undue burden. To a certain extent, reasonable accommodation 
would still be required to fulfil the Convention’s obligation to ensure 
equality and non-discrimination even if its denial was not explicit 
in the Convention’s understanding of discrimination. Its inclusion 
in the definition, however, emphasises the substantive nature of the 
equality principle and allows for an analysis of discrimination that 
focuses more directly on the positive measures needed to ameliorate 
disadvantage.
The meaning of “reasonable accommodation” and “disproportionate 
or undue burden” must be interpreted in light of the text and context 
of the Convention including the need to ensure substantive equality. 
As discussed above, the scope and content of the legal right to equality 
61 Art 2: “‘Universal design’ means the design of products, environments, programmes and ser-
vices to be usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation 
or specialised design. ‘Universal design’ shall not exclude assistive devices for particular groups 
of persons with disabilities where this is needed”.
62 Art 2.
63 See n 44 above, para 28. The Committee cites Art 2 of the CRPD and notes that under the 
ICESCR “the denial of reasonable accommodation should be included in national legislation 
as a prohibited form of discrimination on the basis of disability”.
64 Art 2.
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and non-discrimination and the resulting state responsibilities must be 
understood with reference to the underlying concept of equality. The 
nature of the concept both refl ects and determines the aims which the 
equality principle is trying to achieve. As such, the objectives of substan-
tive equality suggested by Fredman – which are supported by the Con-
vention’s text – can assist us when delineating the reach of the reasonable 
accommodation concept and the limits of any undue burden defence. If 
equality is aimed at breaking cycles of disadvantage, promoting the equal 
dignity and worth of all, positively affi rming and celebrating identity, 
and facilitating full participation then its antithesis – discrimination 
including the denial of reasonable accommodation – can be measured 
and redressed in accordance with these goals. 
Article 24: Equality and Inclusion in Education
The importance of accommodation to achieving real equality is under-
scored by the distinction between inclusion and integration. The Con-
vention recognises that while “inclusion” demands a move away from 
“exclusion” and segregation, it goes beyond a concept of mere integra-
tion. Integration refl ects a formal requirement that students with dis-
abilities be allowed to attend “mainstream” schools, but the experience 
in a number of countries has demonstrated that integration without 
accommodation has largely failed.65 According to the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education: 
“Attempts to a simple integration into mainstream schools without accom-
panying structural changes (for instance, organization, curriculum and teach-
ing and learning strategies) have been shown, and will continue for a variety 
of reasons, to fail to meet the educational rights of persons with disabilities. 
Indeed, integration may simply lead to exclusion in the mainstream rather 
than in the special schools”.66 
65 For example, Banks and Kayess observed that efforts to achieve inclusion in education in Aus-
tralia through integrating students without accommodation led to assimilation rather than full 
inclusion and the realisation of substantive equality since “the behavioural, social and learning 
norms that were used to establish rules and expectations by schools had the effect of systemati-
cally excluding students with disabilities from access and participation in school activities and 
learning”. See Robin Banks and Rosemary Kayess, “The Disability Discrimination Act: Working 
Toward Compliance” (1999), Unpublished Manuscript, cited in Mary Keeffe-Martin and Kate 
Lindsay, “Issues in Australian Disability Discrimination Case Law and Strategic Approaches 
for the Lawful Management of Inclusion”, (2002) 7 Australia and New Zealand Journal of Law 
and Education 161–177. For a discussion of “integration” and the limits of accommodation in 
the Hong Kong context, see Donna Kam Pun Wong, Veronica Pearson and Eva Mei Kuen Lo, 
“Competing Philosophies in the Classroom: A Challenge to Hong Kong Teachers”, (2004) 
8 International Journal of Inclusive Education 261.
66 See Muñoz (n 34 above) para 12.
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Achieving inclusion – a concept which has been informed by human 
rights, the social model of disability and substantive equality – instead 
calls for accommodation and a holistic, contextual approach.67
Article 24 of the CRPD is extensive and in its entirety provides a 
detailed framework for understanding the meaning of inclusion as it 
relates to the right to education and equality and non-discrimination in 
education.68 It embraces the understanding of discrimination and accom-
modation discussed above and clearly links the concept of inclusion with 
a right to education without discrimination. It provides for a right of per-
sons with disabilities to education and “with a view to realising this right 
without discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity” states must 
“ensure an inclusive education system at all levels and lifelong learning”.
The Convention sets out the relevant state obligations and provides 
that inclusive education should be directed towards achieving a num-
ber of aims – which are similar to Fredman’s proposed aims of substan-
tive equality. These include 
“the full development of human potential and sense of dignity and self-
worth, and the strengthening of respect for human rights, fundamental free-
doms and human diversity; the development by persons with disabilities of 
their personality, talents and creativity, as well as their mental and physical 
abilities, to their fullest potential; and enabling persons with disabilities to 
participate effectively in a free society”.69
The Convention also requires that persons with disabilities not be 
excluded from the general education system on the basis of disability; 
that persons with disabilities can access an inclusive, quality and free 
primary education and secondary education on an equal basis with oth-
ers in the communities in which they live; that reasonable accommoda-
tion of the individual’s needs be provided; that persons with disabilities 
receive the necessary support within the general education system to 
facilitate their effective education; and that effective individualised sup-
port measures are provided in environments that maximise academic and 
social development, consistent with the goal of full inclusion.70
Article 24 also lists a number of detailed measures which states must 
take to “enable persons with disabilities to learn life and social develop-
ment skills to facilitate their full and equal participation in education and 
67 See n 34 above.
68 See Vanessa Torres Hernandez, “Making Good on the Promise of International Law: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Inclusive Education in China and 
India”, (2008) 17 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 497–527.
69 Art 24(1)(a)–(c).
70 Art 24(2).
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as members of the community”.71 These include, for example, facilitating 
the learning of Braille and sign language and promoting the linguistic 
identity of the deaf community.72 States must also take appropriate mea-
sures 
“to employ teachers, including teachers with disabilities, who are qualifi ed in 
sign language and/or Braille, and to train professionals and staff who work at 
all levels of education. Such training shall incorporate disability awareness 
and the use of appropriate augmentative and alternative modes, means and 
formats of communication, educational techniques and materials to support 
persons with disabilities”.73
III. The Hong Kong Legal Framework
These international human rights instruments – which affi rm the con-
cepts of substantive equality and inclusion generally and in education in 
particular – provide the basis for an assessment of the extent to which a 
right to equality and non-discrimination supports inclusion in education 
for students with disabilities at the domestic level. Indeed, the ability of 
a substantive equality principle to achieve transformation and the goals 
of full inclusion and participation depends to a large extent on how it is 
implemented and refl ected in domestic law. This section focuses on the 
Hong Kong legal framework as a case study of a common law jurisdiction 
within the Asian region with a reasonably comprehensive regime of anti-
discrimination law and a constitutional right to equality. The CRPD has 
applied to China, including Hong Kong, since August 2008 and therefore 
Hong Kong has an international obligation to review its laws and poli-
cies to ensure compliance with the Convention’s provisions, including 
Article 24, and should submit its report – which will form part of China’s 
report – to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 
Convention’s monitoring body, in 2010 according to Articles 35 and 36.74 
71 Art 24(3).
72 Art 24(3)(a) and (b).
73 Art 24(4).
74 The Hong Kong Government conducted a six-week public consultation from 17 February to 
31 March 2010 on the outline of topics to be included in Hong Kong’s initial report – which 
will form part of China’s report – to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
In accordance with Art 35, each state party to the CRPD must submit an initial report to the 
Committee on the measures taken to give effect to its obligations under the Convention within 
two years after the Convention’s entry into force for the state party concerned. For a discussion 
of potential concerns in the Hong Kong context, see Carole J. Petersen, “China’s Ratifi cation of 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Implications for Hong Kong”, 
(2008) 38 HKLJ 611–643. 
Article_11.indd   437 9/16/2010   5:55:16 PM
438 Kelley Loper (2010) HKLJ
While Hong Kong law provides extensive protection from disability 
discrimination in many fi elds, including education, its capacity to rem-
edy structural and social barriers is limited and legal reforms are needed 
in order to more fully conform to the equality and inclusion obligations 
in international human rights law. These limitations and suggestions for 
change are discussed below.
The Basic Law and the Bill of Rights
Hong Kong’s regional constitution, the Basic Law, provides for the right 
to “equality before the law” in Article 25 and has been interpreted in 
conjunction with Articles 1 and 22 of the Bill of Rights which essen-
tially duplicate Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR. These provisions form 
the basis of a constitutional right to equality in the Hong Kong con-
text. Although Hong Kong courts have not considered disability cases 
under these provisions, the courts’ approach in cases concerning other 
forms of discrimination is instructive and points to some potential for 
a right to equality to provide a stronger basis for greater inclusion in 
Hong Kong.
First, the courts have accepted that the constitution provides protec-
tion from discrimination on the grounds listed in the ICCPR and Bill of 
Rights.75 While this list does not specify disability, it is non-exhaustive 
and contains the general category of “other status” which has been inter-
preted to cover disability in international human rights instruments.76 
In addition, Hong Kong courts have held that prohibited discrimination 
includes indirect, as well as direct, discrimination77 and have adopted a 
justifi cation test that could require special measures under certain cir-
cumstances.78 The Court of Final Appeal in Yau Yuk Lung, a case chal-
lenging discriminatory provisions in the Crimes Ordinance, recognised 
that the guarantee of equality before the law in the Hong Kong consti-
tution “does not invariably require exact equality. Differences in legal 
treatment may be justifi ed for good reason”.79 To pass the test, the differ-
75 See, for example, Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung [2007] 3 HKLRD 903, paras 9–11. 
76 See, for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
5: Persons with Disabilities, UN Doc E/1995/22, 9 December 1994, paras 5–6 in which the 
Committee confi rmed that the requirement that the rights in the Covenant will be exercised 
without discrimination of any kind on the grounds of “other status” “clearly applies to discrimi-
nation on the grounds of disability”. As noted above, Art 2(2) of the ICESCR lists the same 
grounds as Art 2(1) of the ICCPR. 
77 Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211.
78 See n 75 above.
79 Ibid.
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ence in treatment must pursue a legitimate aim, be rationally connected 
to that aim, and must be no more than necessary to accomplish it.80 
This opens the door for special measures which could support inclusion 
if interpreted with reference to the principle and goals of substantive 
equality.
The Hong Kong courts’ reliance on comparative human rights case 
law and materials produced by human rights treaty bodies, such as the 
General Comments discussed in section II, creates the potential for a 
richer understanding of equality in Hong Kong constitutional law that is 
more capable of supporting inclusion.81
The Disability Discrimination Ordinance (DDO)
In addition to constitutional guarantees, Hong Kong has enacted leg-
islation prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of 
disability, victimisation, disability harassment, vilifi cation and serious 
vilifi cation.82 This section examines the extent to which the DDO 
supports non-discrimination in education – in the sense of inclusion – 
and whether it fully implements Hong Kong’s commitments under the 
CRPD, especially those prescribed by Article 24. An analysis of the DDO 
illustrates the diffi culties encountered by courts when applying disability 
80 Ibid.
81 Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690. In this case, the 
Court of First Instance relied on CEDAW for assistance in elaborating the nature and limits of 
special measures in Hong Kong anti-discrimination law and Art 25 of the Basic Law. See also 
R v Sin Yau-ming (1991) 1 HKPLR 88 at 107. The CA held that when inter preting the Bill 
of Rights, guidance “can be derived from decisions taken in common law jurisdictions which 
contain a constitutionally entrenched Bill of Rights. We can also be guided by decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights … and the European Human Rights Commission … Fur-
ther, we can bear in mind the comments and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee … I would hold none of these to be binding upon us, although in so far as they 
refl ect the interpretation of articles in the Covenant, and are directly related to Hong Kong 
legislation, I would consider them as of the greatest assistance and give to them considerable 
weight”. Art 84 of the Basic Law provides that the courts “may refer to precedents of other 
common law jurisdictions”. Director of Immigration v Chong Fung Yuen (2001) 4 HKCFAR 211 
confi rmed that “the courts should give a generous interpre tation to the provisions in Chap-
ter III [of the Basic Law] that contain constitutional guarantees of freedoms that lie at the 
heart of Hong Kong’s separate system”. For discussion of Hong Kong’s reliance on international 
and comparative law, see, Carole J. Petersen, “Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of 
International Human Rights Treaties in Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Fu Hualing, Lison 
Harris and Simon N. M. Young (eds), Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The Struggle for 
Coherence (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), pp 33–53; Anthony Mason “The Place of 
Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in 
Hong Kong”, (2007) 37 HKLJ 299–317; Johannes M. M. Chan, “Basic Law and Constitutional 
Review: The First Decade”, (2007) 37 HKLJ 407–47; and Johannes M. M. Chan, “Hong Kong’s 
Bill of Rights: Its Reception of and Contribution to International and Comparative Jurispru-
dence”, (1998) 47 ICLQ 306–36.
82 DDO ss 6, 7, 22, 23, 46 and 47.
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discrimination law in Hong Kong – and in many other jurisdictions with 
similar legislation. It argues that the tension between formal and sub-
stantive approaches to equality has limited the statute’s ability to achieve 
inclusion and that reform is necessary. 
In particular, the DDO lacks an express requirement to provide rea-
sonable accommodation as part of the obligation not to discriminate. 
To some extent the DDO implicitly requires reasonable accommodation 
in education but this is limited and indirect and does not encourage a 
focus on the measures needed to promote equality when determining 
whether discrimination has occurred.83 As discussed in section II, reason-
able accommodation is a potentially powerful legal tool which could be 
used to transform social structures as demanded by substantive equality. 
Also, in order to establish direct discrimination under the DDO a real 
or hypothetical comparator must be identifi ed since direct discrimina-
tion is defi ned as “less favourable treatment” than someone without a 
disability. Therefore, the process of determining discrimination is a rela-
tive exercise.84 This process is fraught with diffi culties since disabled and 
non-disabled persons are often not in comparable situations and thus 
the comparator analysis is often strained and artifi cial. The outcome of 
a claim which hinges on fi nding a comparator may rely too heavily on a 
formal equality principle which does not refl ect the insights about dis-
ability and discrimination that the social model and substantive equality 
provide. These issues are discussed in more detail below.
DDO Education Provisions: Reasonable Accommodation and Exceptions
To some degree, the DDO refl ects the social model of disability and the 
concept of substantive equality. First, it prohibits indirect, as well as 
direct, discrimination. Also, unlike other anti-discrimination laws, such 
as the Sex Discrimination Ordinance (SDO)85 and the Race Discrimina-
tion Ordinance (RDO),86 the DDO is in a sense inherently substantive 
in its approach because of its “asymmetrical” nature. In other words the 
Ordinance makes discrimination unlawful only on the basis of disability 
and does not allow claims from individuals for discrimination on the 
basis of a lack of a disability, thus taking context and group characteris-
tics into account. For example, a student without a learning impairment 
83 See DDO ss 24(4) and 4(a).
84 Section 6 of the DDO provides that “A person discriminates against another person in any cir-
cumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Ordinance if (a) on the ground of 
that other person’s disability he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat a person 
without a disability”.
85 Cap 480, Laws of Hong Kong.
86 Cap 602, Laws of Hong Kong.
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could not bring a claim that he/she was discriminated against because 
another student with such a disability was given more time to complete 
an examination. This contrasts with the SDO which is symmetrical 
since it applies to discrimination directed against both men and women – 
although all of the anti-discrimination ordinances contain exceptions 
for special measures.87 The DDO’s asymmetry indicates some recognition 
of actual disadvantage as demanded by a substantive equality principle. 
In addition, although the defi nition of disability largely refl ects a medi-
cal model since it is essentially a list of impairments, it also includes a 
disability that presently exists, previously but no longer exists, may exist 
in the future or is imputed to a person.88 An understanding of disability 
that is not necessarily linked to an actual impairment in a medical sense 
signals a nod towards the social model.
The scope of the Ordinance’s application is broad and includes 
employment, education, and the provision of goods, services and facili-
ties among other fi elds. Pursuant to s 24, it is unlawful for an educational 
establishment to discriminate against a person with a disability in the 
application process by refusing or failing to accept that person’s applica-
tion for admission as a student; or in the terms or conditions on which 
it is prepared to admit that person as a student.89 This provision on its 
own seems to provide for a blanket right to at least integration in educa-
tion unless admitting someone as a student “would require services or 
facilities that are not required by students who do not have a disability 
and the provision of which would impose unjustifi able hardship on the 
educational establishment”.90
The Ordinance explains that in determining what constitutes “unjus-
tifi able hardship”, all relevant circumstances of the particular case are to 
be taken into account including the reasonableness of any accommoda-
tion; the nature of the benefi t or detriment likely to accrue or be suffered 
by any persons concerned.91 This can include an assessment of available 
resources. Therefore, the defence of unjustifi able hardship in the DDO 
to some extent, as a practical matter, incorporates a need to provide 
“reasonable accommodation”. In other words in order to avoid discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability, a school must not only admit disabled 
applicants but must accommodate them unless the services or facilities 
which constitute the accommodation reach the level of “unjustifi able 
87 SDO s 48, DDO s 50, RDO s 49. The Family Status Discrimination Ordinance, Cap 527, Laws 
of Hong Kong, also includes an exception for special measures in s 36. 
88 DDO s 2(1).
89 DDO s 24(1).
90 DDO s 24(4).
91 DDO s 4.
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hardship”. There is no explicit, direct obligation to ensure reasonable 
accommodation, however, and unlike the CRPD the denial of reasonable 
accommodation is not included as part of the defi nition of discrimination 
in the DDO.92
It is also unlawful for an educational establishment to discriminate 
against a student with a disability by denying or limiting that student’s 
access to any benefi t, service or facility provided by the educational 
establishment; by expelling that student; or by subjecting that student to 
any other detriment.93 Notably the unjustifi able hardship defence does 
not apply to this sub-section of the education provisions.
Certain exemptions related to education may limit the law’s capacity 
to ensure equality and encourage inclusion. Discrimination in the educa-
tion context is exempted if the person claiming disability discrimination 
is not reasonably capable of performing the actions or activities reason-
ably required by the educational establishment in relation to students at 
that educational establishment; or if the students who participate in or 
are to participate in those actions or activities are selected by a method 
which is reasonable on the basis of their skills and abilities relevant to 
those actions and relative to each other.94 This seems to be a particularly 
broad exemption that undermines the aims of inclusion and does little 
to encourage transformation of school curricula and systems which pro-
mote competitive, merit-based criteria for the selection of students. It 
may also perpetuate assumptions about persons with disabilities based on 
stereotypes about their abilities and exclude them from activities which 
are not deemed suitable by a non-disabled society which has built struc-
tures designed for “normally” disabled people – in Nussbaum’s sense of 
this term. This exception allows educational establishments to measure 
the capabilities of students with disabilities with reference to educational 
arrangements which may be considered “normal” but which have the 
effect of limiting inclusion (and undermining substantive equality). In 
other words, if “reasonable” expectations which accord with the “norm” 
in the educational environment have the effect of excluding students 
with disabilities, then these could solidify marginalisation.
Although the DDO’s education provisions are largely copied from the 
Australian Disability Discrimination Act,95 this particular exemption 
is not found in the Australian Act’s education section. It has instead 
been copied from an exemption elsewhere in both the DDO and the 
92 See Petersen (n 74 above) at 633.
93 DDO s 24(2).
94 DDO s 24(5).
95 See n 8 above.
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Australian Act which deals with the specifi c situation of sports.96 Apply-
ing this exception more broadly to education risks allowing unjustifi -
able discrimination and limiting the law’s ability to provide the basis for 
inclusion and substantive equality.
Another provision in the Australian Act which arguably supports 
inclusion has not been duplicated in the Hong Kong statute. The 
Australian Act makes it “unlawful for an education provider to dis-
criminate against a person on the ground of the person’s disability by 
developing curricula or training courses having a content that will either 
exclude the person from participation, or subject the person to any other 
detriment; or by accrediting curricula or training courses having such a 
content”.97
Defi nition of Discrimination: The Comparator Problem
An additional problem is that a claimant with a disability who alleges 
disability discrimination must designate a real or hypothetical non-
disabled comparator who is similarly situated to the claimant but treated 
more favourably. Diffi culties identifying a comparator illustrate the prob-
lems with a formal understanding of equality when applied to disability 
discrimination claims.
This was highlighted in the landmark Australian case Purvis v New 
South Wales.98 The case originated in a claim of direct disability discrimi-
nation made on behalf of a boy with an intellectual disability who had 
been expelled from a “mainstream” high school after exhibiting vio-
lent behaviour caused by brain damage. Initially the Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission upheld the claim and took 
an approach that refl ected the social disability and substantive equality 
models. The Commissioner argued that the school had not provided suf-
fi cient support and could have done more to accommodate the student 
(such as provide training to school staff).99
The case eventually reached the High Court and the majority took 
a different view on how to determine the characteristics of an appropri-
ate comparator. Both the DDO and the Australian Act require that a 
comparison of the cases of persons with or without a disability shall be 
96 DDO s 35 and ibid. s 28.
97 Ibid. (DDA) s 22(2A).
98 Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) [2003] HCA 62; (2003) 202 
ALR 133. For a discussion of this case, including the comparator issue, see Elizabeth Dick-
son, “Disability Discrimination in Education: Purvis v New South Wales (Department of Edu-
cation and Training), Amendment of the Education Provisions of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1992 (Cth) and the Formulation of Disability Standards for Education”, (2005) 24 UQLJ 
213–222.
99 Mary Keeffe-Martin and Kate Lindsay (n 65 above) at 7–10.
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such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not 
materially different, in the other.100
The “irrelevant” circumstance would be the prohibited ground – in 
this case disability. So it is necessary to choose a non-disabled compara-
tor who is otherwise similarly situated. This analysis is designed to sift out 
all other factors apart from the prohibited ground in order to establish 
whether less favourable treatment – direct discrimination – has occurred. 
The question in Purvis was whether the behaviour – the violence – was 
part of or caused by the disability and therefore irrelevant for purposes 
of comparison (if so, the non-disabled comparator would not exhibit the 
behaviour) or whether the violent behaviour should be considered sepa-
rately from the disability (in which case it should be attributed to the 
comparator in order to ensure that the relevant circumstances are the 
same). Of course the outcome would be different, depending on which 
approach a court resolves to take.
In Purvis, the three judge majority took the second approach and 
held that the school had not discriminated against the student. The two 
minority judges, however, adopted the social model of disability – and 
substantive equality – in their reasoning stating that the “purpose of a 
disability discrimination Act would be defeated if the comparator issue 
was decided in a way that enabled the characteristics of the disabled 
person to be attributed to the comparator”.101 They added that “[i]f the 
functional limitations and consequences of being blind or an amputee 
were to be attributed to the comparator as part of the relevant circum-
stances, for example, persons suffering from those disabilities would lose 
the protection of the Act in many situations”.102
In this case the unjustifi able hardship defence was not available since 
the boy was already a student at the school and the Australian Act, 
like the DDO, only provided for an unjustifi able hardship defence at 
the stage of determining whether to enrol a student at a school and not 
once the student had been enrolled. If it had been available, the court 
may have avoided an over emphasis on a strained comparator analysis 
and could have shifted the focus to the school environment and what 
the school did – or could have done – to manage the boy’s disability 
and behaviour.103 The DDA – but not the Hong Kong Ordinance – has 
since been amended to include an unjustifi able hardship defence in those 
100 DDO s 8, DDA s 5(1). Although the language of the defi nition of direct discrimination in the 
Australian Act is different, it too requires a comparison with a person without the disability in 
circumstances that are not materially different.
101 Purvis (n 98 above) at para 130.
102 Ibid.
103 Dickson (n 98 above) at 218–219 and Keeffe-Martin and Lindsay (n 65 above) at 7–10. 
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circumstances.104 In an employment discrimination case brought under 
the DDO in 2008, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal accepted the reason-
ing of the majority in Purvis when identifying a comparator.105 The Hong 
Kong court mentioned the minority opinion in the Australian judgment, 
but rejected it in favour of separating the attributes of the disability from 
the disability itself as the court ultimately concluded in Purvis.
There have been only a handful of disability discrimination cases in 
Hong Kong which have reached the courts and only one has involved 
a claim of disability discrimination in education. These cases have also 
demonstrated the comparator problem in the Hong Kong context.106 
Ma Bik Yung v Ko Chuen107 involved a woman who claimed that a taxi 
driver discriminated against her on the basis of her disability since he 
rudely refused to help her with her wheelchair and had subjected her 
to harassment. The court chose as a comparator an able-bodied passen-
ger who had heavy luggage. Petersen has pointed out that this is rather 
strained and indeed a disabled person and the person with heavy luggage 
are not really in similarly situated circumstances since the person with 
heavy luggage could have more easily placed the luggage in the taxi on 
her own.108 A similar observation could be made about the comparator 
in the Purvis case. A boy without the disability and with the violent 
behaviour caused by the disability would not have been similarly situ-
ated since he may have more easily responded to discipline or may have 
had more control over his behaviour in the fi rst place. The measures 
needed to accommodate the boy with the disability – and thus the envi-
ronmental impediments – would also likely be quite different in the two 
situations. 
The comparator problem was also apparent in Tong Wai Ting v Secre-
tary for Education,109 a case decided in August 2009 by the Court of First 
Instance, which challenged the imposition of an age limit of 18 years for 
free public education for students with intellectual disabilities attending 
special schools. The court chose as a comparator a non-disabled second-
ary school student in a mainstream school who had completed 11 years 
of free education but who wished to repeat secondary 5 in order to pass 
the public examinations. It held that the mainstream school students’ 
104 DDA s 22(4).
105 M v Secretary for Justice [2009] 2 HKLRD 298.
106 See Petersen (n 74 above) at 631–633.
107 [1999] 1 HKC 714 (at fi rst instance) and [2000] 1 HKLRD 514 (Court of Appeal). The case 
also reached the Court of Final Appeal but the court only considered whether it could order an 
apology as an appropriate remedy under the anti-discrimination statutes.
108 See Petersen (n 74 above) at 632 and Carole J. Petersen, “Implementing Equality: An Analysis 
of Two Recent Decisions under Hong Kong’s Anti-Discrimination Laws” 29 HKLJ 178 at 190.
109 [2009] HKEC 1367.
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application to repeat a year would not be automatically approved – and 
therefore the two students would have been treated in the same way 
and thus there was no discrimination. The two students, however, were 
facing different conditions which were not actually comparable. They 
were not really similarly situated since they were in separate school 
environments with an entirely different set of expectations so meeting 
the requirements of the comparator test would be virtually impossible.
IV. Conclusions
The reasoning of the Hong Kong courts in these cases – and the courts of 
other jurisdictions in similar cases – when applying anti-discrimination 
law demonstrates the law’s limitations for furthering the goals of inclu-
sion in education. The legislation and its interpretation have been 
impeded by a formal approach to equality and non-discrimination and 
an insuffi cient understanding of substantive equality. In particular, the 
DDO lacks a strong reasonable accommodation obligation, contains an 
overly broad exception in the education provisions, and necessitates the 
identifi cation of a similarly situated comparator even in situations which 
are arguably incomparable. Given the new paradigm of the CRPD, the 
social model of disability, and the substantive equality requirements in 
international human rights law generally, these limitations hinder Hong 
Kong’s ability to fully implement its international legal commitments in 
this area.
Nevertheless amendments to the DDO could resolve some of these 
diffi culties. First, the comparator problem could be partly ameliorated by 
amending the defi nition of discrimination in the DDO to clearly include 
the denial of reasonable accommodation, refl ecting the language of the 
CRPD. Again, this could help shift the analysis towards a discussion 
of necessary accommodation and away from strained arguments about 
whether a comparison of two similarly situated cases – apart from the 
disability – show a violation of the equal treatment principle. If such 
a discussion – including how to delineate the boundaries of “unjustifi -
able hardship” – is supported by a substantive equality principle which 
focuses on the aims of equality proposed by Fredman and articulated 
in the CRPD, then equality law could play a greater role in transform-
ing social barriers and achieving inclusion. Also, exceptions which are 
overly broad in the education provisions in the DDO should be removed 
or amended.
In addition, Hong Kong should consider enacting specifi c education 
legislation which sets out more explicit requirements that more fully 
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implement stated policy imperatives and which could better support and 
elaborate measures to achieve inclusion. Such legislation could supple-
ment and further the aims of a right to equality and non-discrimination 
as it has in other jurisdictions. Legislation governing inclusion in edu-
cation for persons with disabilities has been enacted in some locations 
which also have anti-discrimination legislation and constitutional equal-
ity guarantees.110 While certainly not perfect, these models help avoid 
the diffi culties inherent in the sole use of anti-discrimination law as the 
impetus towards greater inclusion. Such efforts at legal reform and policy 
initiatives towards inclusion in education should be guided and sup-
ported by international human rights instruments, especially the CRPD.
Disability forces us to confront how we conceptualise the notion of 
“equality” and raises questions about our objectives. What are we trying 
to achieve? What legal measures are needed to meet these aims? Prob-
ably more than any other prohibited ground of discrimination, disability 
requires a substantive approach to dismantling discriminatory barriers. 
To achieve the goals of participation and inclusion, accommodation and 
even transformation are needed. Disability in particular makes us query 
in a profound way what we mean by “normal” and challenges us to look 
at the implications of the ways in which we have constructed our society. 
A substantive equality principle – supported by effective legal measures – 
can play an important role in addressing these challenges and promoting 
inclusion in education and in Hong Kong society more generally.
110 For example, the US Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Part IV of the 
UK Education Act 1996 and the SEN Code of Practice.
Article_11.indd   447 9/16/2010   5:55:16 PM
Article_11.indd   448 9/16/2010   5:55:16 PM
